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We examine the labor supply of politicians using data on Members of the European Parliament (MEPs).
We exploit the introduction of a law that equalized MEPs' salaries, which had previously differed by
as much as a factor of ten. Doubling an MEP's salary increases the probability of running for reelection
by 23 percentage points and increases the logarithm of the number of parties that field a candidate
by 29 percent of a standard deviation. A salary increase has no discernible impact on absenteeism
or shirking from legislative sessions; in contrast, non-pecuniary motives, proxied by home-country
corruption, substantially impact the intensive margin of labor supply. Finally, an increase in salary
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The labor market for politicians is unlike that of most occupations: salaries are determined through
legislation rather than market forces and politicians vie for a ﬁxed number of positions through
public competition, facing the possibility of dismissal only once each electoral cycle. Since politi-
cians’ salaries are a policy variable, it is particularly important to identify the role that ﬁnancial
compensation plays in their labor supply. Moreover, given the visible nature of their duties, the
lack of direct supervision, and the public goods aspect of their jobs, it is also critical to understand
how social norms aﬀect politicians’ behavior while they are in oﬃce.
In this paper, we analyze the impact of both salary and social norms on the labor supply of
the Members of the European Parliament (MEPs). We examine three aspects of politicians’ labor
supply: (i) the extensive margin (the willingness to run for oﬃce), (ii) the intensive margin (eﬀort
exerted while in oﬃce), and (iii) selection eﬀects (quality of elected candidates).
Our main source of identiﬁcation is a recent change in the way that MEP salaries are determined.
The European Parliament is the directly elected legislative chamber of the European Union. It is
currently composed of 736 MEPs from 27 constituent countries. MEPs are elected for 5-year terms
by voters from their home countries. Prior to 2009, each MEP received the same salary as the
members of the lower house of her home-country national parliament. This induced great variation
in MEPs’ remuneration. For example, in 2004, the highest paid MEPs (those from Italy) were
paid an annual salary of €144,084 while the lowest paid ones (those from Hungary) earned €10,080
per year. Even MEPs from similar countries received very diﬀerent salaries. For example, Spanish
MEPs were paid €38,396 per year, roughly 75% less than Italian MEPs, despite the countries’ near-
identical levels of GDP per capita. In 2005, the two legislative chambers of the European Union
agreed on a salary harmonization: as of the ﬁrst day of the parliamentary term starting in 2009,
almost1 all MEPs receive an identical salary of roughly €84,000. For some MEPs (e.g., those from
Italy) this change induced a large reduction in salary, while for others (e.g., those from Hungary
and Spain), it meant a big raise. At the same time, MEPs are drawn from a heterogeneous mix of
nations, which allows us to examine the supply of politicians as a function not only of income, but
1As we will explain in greater detail later, there is a small fraction (4.5%) of MEPs for whom this salary change
did not apply.
2of home-country norms as well. We can thus compare the eﬀects of pecuniary and non-pecuniary
motivations of politicians.
We measure the extensive margin of labor supply in three ways. First, we examine whether
incumbent MEPs seek reelection. Second, we look at whether MEPs quit before completing their
terms of oﬃce. Third, we identify the number of parties that ﬁeld a candidate.2 We generate
two primary measures of the intensive margin of labor supply: the rate of absences from plenary
sessions, and a more direct proxy for shirking based on instances when an MEP signs the attendance
register (thus collecting a daily stipend) but fails to cast a single vote. Finally, we examine quality
of elected MEPs, as proxied by the selectivity of their undergraduate institutions.
Doubling an MEP’s salary increases the probability she runs for reelection by 23 percentage
points and increases the logarithm of the number of parties that ﬁeld a candidate by 29 percent of
a standard deviation. Moreover, an increase in salary substantially reduces the likelihood that an
MEP will quit before the end of her term. All of these results suggest that monetary remuneration
plays an important role in the willingness to hold political oﬃce. One one hand, these results may
not be surprising – higher salaries attract more applicants in other industries, so why should this
not be the case in politics? But, as we note at the outset, politicians’ labor supply may be governed
by distinct forces. Both non-pecuniary motivations and the role of post-political employment are
such that salary might be of secondary importance relative to other returns to holding oﬃce (see
Diermeier et al. 2005, who argue that this is the case in the U.S. Congress).3
We do not ﬁnd evidence that an increase in salary impacts the intensive margin of labor supply.
In contrast, we ﬁnd a strong eﬀect of non-pecuniary factors on whether MEPs exert eﬀort while
they are in oﬃce. We use cross-sectional variation in corruption as a proxy for the strength of
home-country social capital and ﬁnd that MEPs from more corrupt countries are more likely to
be absent from all votes on a given day. As well as indulging in more absences, MEPs from more
corrupt countries also exhibit a more explicit form of shirking. Each day they are present at the
2Many countries in the European Union use closed-list voting systems where citizens cast votes for parties rather
than individual candidates. Consequently, we are not able to identify the number of individual candidates willing to
run for oﬃce in each country.
3In interpreting our estimates, it is important to note that the elasticity of labor supply will in general depend on
the existence of substitute career options, and in our context, there is a political position that may be a reasonably
close substitute to being an MEP, namely serving in the home-country parliament. Consequently, the impact of
salary on the supply of political candidates may be somewhat lower in other settings.
3parliament, MEPs are meant to sign a register to prove their attendance, entitling them to a daily
allowance of roughly €300.4 MEPs have sometimes abused this system, showing up only to sign
the register. Such behavior has been a source of scandal. In 2004, for example, Austrian MEP
Hans-Peter Martin ﬁlmed other MEPs signing the register shortly after 7am and then immediately
leaving the building. His footage was widely broadcast and caused a public uproar.5 Combining
data from the daily register with roll-call voting data, we identify for each MEP any days on which
she signed the register but was then absent from all votes that day. We ﬁnd that a one standard
deviation increase in corruption in an MEP’s place of origin is associated with a 16 percent increase
in this form of shirking.
Finally, we examine the impact of the salary change on the composition of elected oﬃcials.
Doubling the salary decreases the probability that an elected MEP attended a college ranked
among the top 500 in the world by 4.2 percentage points, or 14 percent.6 Moreover, a salary
increase seems to attract MEPs who shirk more, but this eﬀect is not robust to inclusion of country
ﬁxed eﬀects. Overall, our evidence suggests that higher salaries lower the quality of elected MEPs.
The identifying assumption underlying our results on pecuniary motivations is that the timing
of the salary reform is uncorrelated with other factors that would lead politicians from low-salary
countries to increase their willingness to be MEPs relative to politicians from from high-salary
countries. Another concern is that the reform may have been passed precisely when MEPs from
low-salary countries were more likely to run for reelection and thus were particularly motivated
to raise future salaries. Two sets of facts speak against this alternative explanation. First, such
reverse causality could not account for the increase in the number of parties that ﬁeld candidates
when salaries increase. Second, we demonstrate that whether an MEP voted for or against salary
harmonization is uncorrelated with whether the proposal would raise or lower her salary.7
A large literature examines the theoretical relationship between politicians’ wages, and their
quality, performance, and willingness to run for oﬃce. Caselli and Morelli (2004) consider a setting
4The size of the daily allowance changes somewhat over time.
5See, for example, “European Elections: Martin’s Travels,” The Economist, June 3, 2004.
6College selectivity is highly predictive of market productivity (Kane 1998). It is not immediately clear, however,
whether it is also a good proxy for the quality of a politician. That said, we ﬁnd that, conditional on running,
selectivity of an MEP’s college strongly predicts whether she will win a reelection. This patterns support our view
that college selectivity is a good proxy for MEPs’ quality.
7Moreover, whether an MEP voted for or against salary harmonization is uncorrelated with whether that MEP
subsequently runs for reelection.
4where market and political ability are correlated, so higher wages attract candidates with greater
political skill. Besley (2004) develops a model where higher wages compel politicians to care more
about reelection; an increase in wages thus induces politicians to cater more to voters’ preferences
while in oﬃce. Higher wages, however, might also create negative selection eﬀects, as our results
suggest to be the case. New Hampshire has deliberately kept legislators’ salaries at $100 for their 45
days in session each year (with no per diem), reasoning that this system attracts a more committed
“citizen” legislature. Directly in line with this rhetoric, Besley (2004) discusses how the existence of
non-pecuniary incentives for “public spirited” candidates might cause higher wages to attract less
attractive candidates. Poutvaara and Takalo (2007), Mattozzi and Merlo (2008), and Gagliarducci,
Nannicini, and Naticchioni (2010) consider models where high-ability people self-select into politics;
consequently, higher wages lower the ability threshold at which potential candidates decide to seek
oﬃce.8
In contrast to theoretical work, there is a relative paucity of empirical research on the labor
market for elected oﬃcials, owing in large part to the diﬃculty in credibly identifying a relationship
between pay and the supply of politicians. Outside of politics, one can often use exogenous shocks to
labor demand to identify the elasticity of labor supply, but this approach is not feasible in studying
the labor supply of politicians. Moreover, since salaries are typically set by those currently in oﬃce,
it is usually diﬃcult to rule out the possibility that politicians’ skill aﬀects their salaries rather
than vice versa. A pair of recent papers overcome these diﬃculties by exploiting discontinuities of
politicians’ salaries in population size: Ferraz and Finan (2010) and Gagliarducci and Nannicini
(forthcoming) examine the impact of wages on labor supply and performance of Brazilian municipal
legislators and Italian mayors, respectively, and ﬁnd that higher wages attract more candidates and
higher quality candidates in both contexts. Ferraz and Finan (2010) also ﬁnd evidence that higher
wages induce higher eﬀort, while Gagliarducci and Nannicini (forthcoming) ﬁnd this channel to be
unimportant. Kotakorpi and Poutvaara (2011) study the eﬀect of a wage increase in the Finnish
National Parliament. Using candidates in municipal elections as a control group, they report that
the wage increase led to more educated female candidates but had no eﬀect on the composition
8Messner and Polborn (2004) study a model where candidates are motivated to run in part because they care
about political duties being executed eﬀectively. In this setting, higher wages can decrease the quality of elected
oﬃcials since higher wages allow skilled individuals to more easily free-ride on participation of others.
5of male candidates. Di Tella and Fisman (2004) present evidence that better state-level economic
performance allows U.S. governors to push up their own salaries, while Besley (2004) ﬁnds that U.S.
governors’ salaries increase when their policies are congruent with voter preferences. Groseclose
and Krehbiel (1994) and Hall and van Houweling (1995) report that U.S. congressmen respond to
changes in the ﬁnancial incentives for retirement. The structural estimation exercise of Keane and
Merlo (2010) suggests that a reduction in congressional salaries in the U.S. would disproportionally
induce exit of skilled politicians.
Closest to the context we explore in our paper is the concurrent work by Mocan and Altindag
(2011). They also study the impact of the change in European Parliament salary rules on the
behavior of MEPs. However, they examine the impact of the salary change only on whether MEPs
sign the daily register, while we focus on a broader set of outcomes (the willingness to run for
reelection, quality of MEPs, number of parties that ﬁeld a candidate, absence from roll-call votes,
and so forth). Moreover, in contrast to their ﬁndings, we do not ﬁnd that the salary change has
a signiﬁcant impact on the tendency to sign the daily register. We replicate their point estimate,
which is quite small, and when we cluster our standard errors at the country level,9 the eﬀect is
not statistically signiﬁcant.
Our paper contributes to the existing literature by providing a more complete view of politicians’
labor supply – in our setting, we can examine the impact of both pecuniary and non-pecuniary
factors, measure both the extensive and the intensive margin of labor supply, and also identify
selection eﬀects. Furthermore, in contrast to most earlier work, the European Parliament wage
equalization provides us with a credible source of identiﬁcation of the impact of salary changes.
Finally, some of the outcomes we analyze, such as the supply of political parties, have not been
studied at all in previous work.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section we describe the data
and the institutional background. Section 3 presents the results. The last section concludes.
9Mocan and Altindag (2011) cluster their standard errors at the MEP level.
62 Data and institutional background
The European Parliament is the lower legislative chamber of the European Union. Since 1979,
Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) have been elected every 5 years. The present paper
focuses on the 5th, 6th, and 7th parliaments, elected in 1999, 2004, and 2009 and consisting of 626,
732, and 736 MEPs, respectively.10 Throughout the paper, we will refer to the nth parliament as
EPn.
Each EU member country elects its own MEPs in nationally held elections. The precise electoral
rules diﬀer by country. Importantly for our purposes, many countries utilize closed-list electoral
systems where voters can eﬀectively vote only for political parties as a whole, rather than for
particular candidates. In such countries, competition takes place at the party-level rather than at
the individual-level. Consequently, when we analyze the extensive margin of labor supply, we focus
on incumbents’ willingness to run for reelection and the number of parties that ﬁeld at least one
candidate.11
The work of the European Parliament is centered around the plenary sessions held once or
twice a month. These sessions consist of several daily “sittings” of debate and voting. MEPs sign
attendance registers on each day of a plenary session. The registers are subsequently published in
conjunction with the minutes of the sittings. Similarly, for those votes that are held as roll-call
votes, individual voting is registered and published.
MEPs are remunerated through allowances as well as a monthly salary. Along with reimburse-
ment for travel, staﬀ, and other expenses, MEP allowances include a stipend that is awarded for
each day of a session, if the MEP signs the attendance register. This daily stipend is reduced
by a half if the MEP votes on fewer than 50 percent of the roll-call votes that day. Signing the
register and then immediately leaving is frowned upon, as evidenced by the scandal discussed in
the introduction.
Prior to EP7, MEPs were paid by the member states and earned the same salary as members
of the lower chamber of their respective national parliaments. This system was originally put in
10When Romania and Bulgaria joined the EU in 2007, the total number of MEPs temporarily increased to 785
until the 2009 election.
11An alternative would be to restrict our attention to countries with open-list electoral systems and utilize the
overall number of candidates on the ballot. There are only nine such countries in EP7 (Hix and Hagemann 2009),
however, which is insuﬃcient for this approach.
7place in 1979 as a placeholder until the European Parliament could decide on a uniform system
and level of salaries. Diﬃculties in agreeing to a uniform salary and its implementation, however,
resulted in the national parliament salaries remaining in place for nearly three decades. A new
system was ﬁnally agreed and voted upon on June 23, 2005 and became eﬀective in EP7. The new
system established a uniform salary for all MEPs, paid from the European budget and equal to
38.5% of the salary of a judge at the European Court of Justice. The statute was passed with two
provisos: (i) if any member state wished all of its MEPs to continue to receive the old, national
salary, this would be permitted for a maximum of two parliamentary terms and would be paid for
by the member state, and (ii) any individual MEP who was already in oﬃce before the new statute
was passed could elect to continue to receive the old, national salary (paid by her own member
state) for as long as she continued in oﬃce. In practice, these provisions had little impact on the
implementation of a uniform salary because: (i) no member state elected to continue to pay the
old salaries for its MEPs, and (ii) only 33 MEPs exercised the option to retain the old national
salaries.12 We have been able to identify only 5 of these 33 MEPs, so we cannot exclude all MEPs
with unchanged salaries from our analyses. That said, they comprise less than 5 percent of the
sample, so their eﬀect on our estimates is likely to be small. Moreover, since their salaries did not
actually change, they are likely to bias our estimates toward zero.
The data employed in this paper are derived from a number of sources. We obtained data on
salaries from Corbett, Jacobs, and Shackleton (2005). We use the salaries as of December of 2004
as the measure of the salary level in the 6th parliament (2004-2008). Our key independent variable
∆lnSalaryc is deﬁned as the logarithm of 84,000 (the post-change uniform salary level) minus the
logarithm of the salary for MEPs from country c as of December of 2004.13
The measures of the extensive margin of labor supply are constructed using data available on
the web pages of the European Parliament.14 For EP6 and EP7, for each MEP who served in the
12At ﬁrst glance it might seem surprising that MEPs who received a pay cut would not elect to keep their old
salaries. Doing so, however, would require transferring the burden of payment from the European Parliament to
the taxpayers of one’s own country, which might not be popular with the electorate. More broadly, many legislative
bodies have the legal power to raise their own salaries and yet seldom choose to do so.
13We also considered the tax-adjusted salary change, using the top marginal tax rate in the home country. Since
the tax rates are uncorrelated with initial salaries, this alternative measure yields very similar results.
14Data on whether incumbent MEPs ran for reelection in 2004 was taken in July 2009 from
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/parliament/archive/staticDisplay.do?language=EN&id=75. Information on whether
MEPs ran for reelection in 2009 was downloaded during the election in June 2009. Data on when MEPs
left the parliament was collected in August 2009 from the individual MEP pages on the EP website,
8previous parliament, we deﬁne a variable ReRunip that indicates whether she ran for reelection (i
indexes the MEP and p indexes the parliament).15 For EP5 and EP6, for each MEP who served
in that parliament, we deﬁne an indicator variable PostV oteQuitip which equals 1 if MEP i quit
her job before completing her term at some point after June 23rd of the second calendar year of
parliament p. For p = 6, this indicates that the MEP quit the parliament at some point after
the vote on the salary change. For p = 5, this indicates she quit the parliament during the same
segment of the electoral cycle but in the parliamentary session prior to the introduction of salary
change legislation. Finally, for EP6 and EP7, for each member country, we collected data on the
number of parties that ﬁelded a candidate, taken from the European Parliament’s website.16 The
available data only include parties that received at least 0.5% of the vote. Accordingly, we deﬁne
lnNumPartiescp as the logarithm of the number of parties in country c that received at least 0.5%
of the vote for candidacy to parliament p. These three variables, ReRunip, PostV oteQuitip, and
lnNumPartiescp, will be our measures of the extensive margin of labor supply.
Building on a previous data collection eﬀort by Hix, Noury, and Roland (2007), we also put
together comprehensive data on attendance and roll-call voting in the daily sittings of EP5, EP6,
and the ﬁrst year of EP7.17 As mentioned previously, a sitting is a day-long meeting of the
parliament during which roll-call voting takes place. For each sitting, our data contain information
about whether each serving MEP signed the attendance register and how she voted (if at all) on
the issues that day.18 We focus on attendance and voting records during the ﬁrst year of each
parliament, to avoid comparing behaviors across diﬀerent points in the electoral cycle and further
to concentrate on behavior during the period of EP6 that occurred before the salary vote.
Variable FractionAbsentip captures the fraction of sittings in parliamentary session p during
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/members/archive/alphaOrder.do?language=EN.
15These data are missing for 16 observations.
16http://www.europarl.europa.eu/parliament/archive/elections2009/en/new_parliament_en.html and
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/parliament/archive/elections2009/en/hist_results_be_en.html accessed in July
2009.
17Data on voting and attendance in the plenaries of EP6 and EP7 was collected from the published daily minutes
on the European Parliament website, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/activities/plenary/home.do?language=EN, be-
tween February 2007 and October 2010. We also collected data on attendance in EP5 which we combined with voting
information from the Hix, Noury, and Roland (2007) data (downloaded in November 2007).
18The published minutes of the meetings also contain information on so-called vote corrections where an MEP asks
to have her registered vote changed in the minutes (without aﬀecting the actual outcome). In our empirical work we
focus on the pre-correction voting outcome but results are robust to considering corrected votes instead. There are
also some instances of secret ballot votes in the data, where each MEP’s vote is not made public. For these it is still
recorded whether each MEP voted.
9which MEP i did not participate in any of the votes during the day. (An abstention counts as a
vote.) Variable FractionSignedInip reﬂects the fraction of sittings in parliament p during which
MEP i signed the daily register. This outcome measure is diﬃcult to interpret since it conﬂates
eﬀort (showing up to work) and greed (signing the register even if you are not going to work), and
we use it primarily to compare our results to existing ﬁndings in the literature. Finally, motivated
by the scandals mentioned in the introduction, variable FractionSignedInAbsentip is deﬁned as
the fraction of those sittings in year t when MEP i signed the register but cast zero votes. There
are legitimate reasons an MEP might sign the register but fail to participate in votes – for example,
she might spend the entire day in meetings. That said, we are primarily interested in salary and
corruption as predictors of FractionSignedInAbsentip, and there are no obvious reasons why these
variables would be correlated with such alternative uses of an MEP’s time. Moreover, if we focus
on days when the parliament voted on more contentious issues – those that passed or failed by
a margin smaller than 10 votes – we obtain very similar results. Variables FractionAbsentip,
FractionSignedInip, and FractionSignedInAbsentip are our measures of the intensive margin of
labor supply.
We are also interested in the impact of salary change on the selection of politicians. We use
global rankings of colleges attended by MEPs as a measure of MEP quality. From MEPs’ individual
websites, we identiﬁed where each attended college. We were able to obtain this information for
nearly 90 percent of the sample. We merged these data with the 2010 Academic Ranking of
World Universities, which provides a rank for the top 500 universities in the world.19 The variable
FractionRankedCollegecp is the fraction of MEPs from country c in parliament p who attended a
school ranked in the top 500.20 Most MEPs attend college in their home country, and countries vary
widely in their universities’ representation in the ranking. Consequently, FractionRankedCollegecp
is not particularly useful for identifying cross-sectional variation in the quality of MEPs across
countries, but it does capture the change in quality of MEPs from a given country over time.
We could have also deﬁned similar variables with a diﬀerent cutoﬀ, e.g., a fraction of MEPs who
19Since rankings might change somewhat over time, it would have been more suitable to utilize the rank of a school
at the time when the MEP attended it, but the available data only go back to 2003 and many MEPs have been out
of college for more than seven years.
20For our main speciﬁcation, we simply drop the 10 percent of MEPs without education data and treat the
information as missing randomly. Including all MEPs in the analysis and coding those with missing data as having
gone to an unranked school strengthens our results.
10attended a school ranked in the top 200, but since only about 29 percent of MEPs with available
education data attended a ranked school at all, FractionRankedCollegecp captures most of the
relevant variation.
MEPs’ individual websites provided us with data on each MEP’s age and periods in oﬃce,
on the basis of which we deﬁne self-explanatory variables Ageip, AgeSqip, and lnTenureip, which
reﬂect age and tenure the ﬁrst year of parliament p. We gathered country-by-year data on GDP per
capita in constant 2000 U.S. dollars, and control for income at the beginning of each parliament
(lnGDPPCcp) from the World Development Indicators. Finally, as our measure of corruption
(Corruptioncp) we use data from Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2010). These data consist
of a composite corruption index that is essentially the ﬁrst principal component of a number of
other commonly used corruption indices, which are usually subjective measures based on surveys
of country experts and investors. For ease of interpretation, we reverse the sign of the original
measure so that higher values indicate greater corruption, and assign a value to each EP-country
observation based on the corruption index in the ﬁrst year of the parliament. By construction, the
mean value of this measure across all countries in the global sample is zero with standard deviation
one; for our sample of European countries it ranges from -2.2 to -0.3. Table 1 reports summary
statistics for the variables used in our analysis.
3 Impact of salary and social norms on labor supply and selection
of MEPs
As we mentioned earlier, in the past MEPs received the same salary as members of the lower house
of their own national parliament. Table 2 reports MEPs’ salaries by country as of December 2004,
during the 6th parliament. Starting with EP7, which began in July 2009, salaries were equalized to
roughly €84,000 for all MEPs. Our empirical strategy for estimating the impact of salary change
on labor supply is based on the assumption that the timing of this salary change is uncorrelated
with a change in omitted variables that would diﬀerentially inﬂuence the labor supply of MEPs
from countries that initially had low and high salaries.
To identify the impact of social capital on labor supply, we rely on the cross-sectional variation
11in corruption across countries. We take a broad interpretation of this country-level measure as
reﬂecting values of public service over private gain.
3.1 Extensive margin of labor supply
Our ﬁrst speciﬁcation examines the impact of the salary change on the willingness of incumbent
MEPs to seek reelection. We consider a linear probability model:21
ReRunip = β0 + β1 × ∆lnSalaryc + β2 × EP7p + β3 × EP7p × ∆lnSalaryc + εip (1)
where p ∈ {6,7}. The sample consists of all MEPs who served in EP5, and those MEPs who
served in EP6 and joined the parliament prior to the announcement of the salary change.22 EP7p
is an indicator variable for whether p = 7. ReRunip denotes whether MEP i ran for reelection for
parliament p, and ∆lnSalaryc is the salary change instituted at the beginning of EP7, deﬁned in
the previous section. In this speciﬁcation, as in all others, robust standard errors are clustered by
country.
Coeﬃcient β1 captures the cross-sectional relationship between the salary in EP6 and the will-
ingness of MEPs who served in EP5 to run for reelection for EP6. Since ∆lnSalaryc is deﬁned
as a constant (ln(84000)) minus log of salary in EP6, a negative β1 indicates a positive cross-
sectional relationship between salary and the extensive margin of labor supply. Coeﬃcient β2 tells
us whether, in the absence of a salary change, MEPs are overall more likely to run for reelection
for EP7 or for EP6. The main coeﬃcient of interest is β3, which identiﬁes the impact of the salary
change on willingness to run for reelection.
Column (1) of Table 3 reports the results without controls. The estimate of β1 is −0.18
(p < 0.01) suggesting that MEPs from high-salary countries were more likely to run for reelection
for EP6. Note, however, that all of the MEPs in the sample had already expressed their willingness
to hold the oﬃce at the salary level oﬀered by their country. Consequently, ˆ β1 should be interpreted
with caution. The estimate of β2 is −0.090 (p < 0.01) which means that, in the absence of a salary
change, MEPs were about 9 percentage points less likely to run for reelection for EP7 than for EP6.
21Throughout the paper we use a linear probability model when the outcome variable is binary. We obtain very
similar results if we use logit or probit speciﬁcations instead.
22This means that we exclude all MEPs from Romania and Bulgaria since they joined in 2007.
12The estimate of β3 is 0.30 (p < 0.01). This implies that doubling an MEP’s salary (a magnitude of
change well within the range of salary changes observed in the data) increases the likelihood that
the MEP runs for reelection by 21 percentage points

ln(2) × ˆ β3 = 0.21

. Given that on average
57 percent of MEPs seek reelection (Table 1), this constitutes a 37 percent increase in labor sup-
ply. This magnitude is suﬃciently large for ˆ β1 + ˆ β3 = 0.13 to be signiﬁcantly higher than zero
(p < 0.01). This means that, even though all MEPs receive the same salary in EP7, those MEPs
who had previously received a higher salary in EP6 are less willing to run for oﬃce in EP7. This
could be caused either by selection (MEPs from higher salary countries have a higher reservation
wage), or by preferences that depend on salary changes as well as salary levels (Kahneman and
Tversky 1979).
Countries in the European Union utilize three diﬀerent types of voting systems. In open-list
systems, voters cast votes for particular candidates (most of whom are identiﬁed with a party). In
closed-list systems, voters vote for parties, each of which maintains a list of candidates. Finally,
in ordered-list systems, voters can either vote for a party or for an individual on a party list, but
a high proportion of votes is required to undo the party-mandated ordering of candidates. The
process of seeking reelection thus diﬀers as a function of the electoral system employed: in an open-
list system, a candidate directly chooses to run while in a closed-list system she needs her party’s
approval to do so. In Figure 1, we plot the change in the fraction of MEPs who run for reelection
against ∆lnSalaryc. As the ﬁgure shows, the positive relationship between the two variables is not
driven by extreme observations, nor by countries with a particular electoral system.
Column (2) of Table 3 adds country by EP controls (lnGDPPCcp and Corruptioncp) to Equa-
tion 1. These variables are measured in the last year of parliament p − 1, i.e., at the time when
the MEP was likely making the decision of whether to run for reelection. Column (3) adds MEP
by EP controls (Ageip, AgeSqip, and lnTenureip), also measured in the last year of parliament
p − 1. Column (4) adds country ﬁxed eﬀects. The estimate of our key coeﬃcient of interest, β3, is
stable across these four speciﬁcations.23 The estimate in column (4), which contains our preferred
speciﬁcation, implies that a doubling of MEP salary increases the likelihood of rerunning by 23
23We also ran a speciﬁcation that included the 2007-2009 change in lnGDPPCcp interacted with EP7 as a control,
to account for possible eﬀects of the ﬁnancial crisis on the decision to run for reelection. This had no eﬀect on the
coeﬃcients of interest in Table 3, or those in Table 4 below.
13percentage points.
A somewhat stronger way to express diminished interest in serving as an MEP is to quit before
the term expires. In Table 4, we consider a linear probability model:
PostV oteQuitip = β0 + β1 × ∆lnSalaryc + β2 × EP6p + β3 × EP6p × ∆lnSalaryc + εip (2)
where p ∈ {5,6} and EP6p is an indicator variable for whether p = 6. Recall that PostV oteQuitip
equals 1 if MEP i quit her job before completing her term at some point after June 23rd of the
second calendar year of parliament p. For p = 6, this indicates quitting the parliament after the
vote on the salary change. For p = 5, this indicates quitting the parliament during the same
segment of the electoral cycle, but in the parliamentary session before the salary change had been
introduced. As in Table 3, Column (1) reports the baseline results, Column (2) adds country by
EP controls, Column (3) adds MEP by EP controls, and Column (4) adds country ﬁxed eﬀects.
The estimate of our key coeﬃcient of interest, β3, changes somewhat across the speciﬁcations, but
it is always negative and is statistically signiﬁcant when we include MEP by EP controls and/or
country ﬁxed eﬀects, our preferred speciﬁcations. Overall, the results in Table 4 suggest that a
lower salary increases the likelihood that an MEP will quit her job before completing her term of
oﬃce.
The results in Tables 3 and 4 focus on the willingness of incumbent politicians to continue to
hold their oﬃces. More directly relevant for the welfare of the electorate is the overall supply of
potential candidates and platforms. It is not feasible to identify the overall number of potential
candidates, however, because only nine member countries have open-list electoral systems. We
therefore focus on the number of political parties that ﬁeld candidates. This measure applies
equally well to countries that use closed-list and open-list electoral systems, since even in countries
with open-list systems almost all candidates are associated with some political party.24 In Table 5,
24Readers familiar primarily with the political system of the United States should note that most European countries
have a large number of politically active parties and some of those parties are at the margin where they might focus
exclusively on national politics or might spend some of their resources vying for a greater role in European politics.
At the same time, in many countries small parties focusing only on European politics (and oftentimes on a single
political issue) also form to ﬁeld candidates exclusively in EP elections.
14we consider OLS speciﬁcations of the form:
lnNumPartiescp = β0 + β1 × ∆lnSalaryc + β2 × EP7p + β3 × EP7p × ∆lnSalaryc + εcp (3)
where p ∈ {6,7}. As Column (1) shows, ˆ β1 = −0.22 (p < 0.05), indicating that, in the cross-
section, countries that paid higher salaries to their MEPs in EP6 had more parties ﬁeld candidates
for those positions. The estimate of β2 is very close to zero, suggesting that in the absence of a
salary change, there would have been no temporal trend in the number of parties ﬁelding candidates
to the European Parliament. The estimate of β3 is 0.16 (p < 0.05). The standard deviation of
lnNumParties in EP6 is 0.37,25 so ˆ β3 implies that doubling MEP salaries would increase the log
number of parties by about 29% of a standard deviation. In Column (2) of Table 5 we add country
by EP controls, and in Column (3) we add country ﬁxed eﬀects. The estimate of β3 is signiﬁcant
in each of the three speciﬁcations.
In Figure 2, we plot the change in lnNumPartiesc against ∆lnSalaryc, indicating electoral
system as open, closed, or ordered. As the ﬁgure shows, the positive relationship between the two
variables is not driven by extreme observations.
The impact of salary on the number of parties that ﬁeld a candidate suggests that increasing
politicians’ salaries provides the electorate with a broader choice of political platforms. As empha-
sized by the literature on the valuation of new goods (Bresnahan and Gordon 1997), this broader
choice set is likely to increase welfare.26 Since voters do not express their willingness to pay to
have one candidate over another, we obviously cannot compute the associated increase in welfare
in monetary terms.27 Moreover, an increase in the number of parties in the European Parliament
may have other, indirect, beneﬁts besides providing the electorate with new platforms they prefer
over the existing ones. For instance, it could be that the presence of competing parties leads the
existing parties to become less corrupt or more responsive to voter preferences.28
25This is somewhat diﬀerent from the overall standard deviation of lnNumParties reported in Table 1, since that
calculation includes observations from both EP6 and EP7.
26For a caveat, however, see Kamenica (2008).
27One possibility might be to use data on vote shares to estimate the fraction of the electorate whose preferred
choice is a new party whose participation was induced by higher salaries, but this approach is not feasible since in
many countries there is substantial entry and exit of parties that participate in European politics.
28This is analogous to standard arguments in industrial organization. Even if few consumers buy products from a
new entrant, the entry can increase consumer welfare by lowering the prices of incumbent ﬁrms.
15Overall, our three measures of the extensive margin of labor supply, ReRunip, PostV oteQuiteip,
and lnNumPartiescp, suggest that the salary associated with a political oﬃce has a substantial
impact on the number of candidates willing to hold that oﬃce.
3.2 Intensive margin of labor supply
In this subsection, we study the eﬀect of pecuniary and non-pecuniary incentives on the inten-
sive margin of labor supply. Our three measures, FractionAbsentip, FractionSignedInip, and
FractionSignedInAbsentip, are deﬁned in Section 2. We begin with our primary measure of the
intensive margin of labor supply, FractionAbsentip, the fraction of sittings in parliament p during
which an MEP cast no votes (abstentions are included as votes cast). In Table 6, we consider OLS
speciﬁcations of the form:
FractionAbsentip = β0 + β1 × ∆lnSalaryc + β2 × EP7p + β3 × EP7p × ∆lnSalaryc + εip. (4)
As noted above, we focus on the ﬁrst year of each parliament to avoid comparing behaviors across
diﬀerent points in the electoral cycle and further to concentrate on behavior during the period
of EP6 that occurred before the salary vote. The coeﬃcient β1 captures any cross-sectional re-
lationship between pre-harmonization salaries and the tendency of MEPs to be absent. All of
the estimates of β1 are negative, but in each case, the coeﬃcient is imprecisely estimated and
statistically insigniﬁcant. Estimates of β2 are also negative but insigniﬁcant.
The point estimates on the main coeﬃcient of interest, β3, are positive and insigniﬁcant. In
some speciﬁcations, the positive estimate is close to conventional signiﬁcance, but when we include
country ﬁxed eﬀects, the estimated coeﬃcient drops to 0.00, with a standard error of 0.019. Thus,
while speciﬁcations with sparse controls might suggest that higher salary decreases eﬀort, our
preferred speciﬁcation implies that salary change has no eﬀect. Moreover, as we shall discuss
below, any impact of salary on eﬀort is likely to be driven by selection eﬀects.
We now turn to the impact of salary on FractionSignedInip, the fraction of days an MEP
signed the daily register in parliament p. We include this speciﬁcation primarily so we can relate
our analysis to the existing literature; as we mentioned earlier, this outcome measure is diﬃcult to
16interpret since it conﬂates eﬀort (showing up to work) and greed (signing the register even if you
are not going to work). In Table 7, we consider OLS speciﬁcations of the form:
FractionSignedInip = β0 + β1 × ∆lnSalaryc + β2 × EP7p + β3 × EP7p × ∆lnSalaryc + εip.(5)
In Column (1), we report the coeﬃcients from the regression in Equation (5). Column (2) adds
country by time period controls. Column (3) adds MEP by time period controls. Column (4) adds
country ﬁxed eﬀects. In a concurrent paper, Mocan and Altindag (2011) also explore how salary
changes induced by the reform in the European Parliament aﬀected the tendency of MEPs to sign
the register. Our speciﬁcation is somewhat diﬀerent from theirs, but it reveals roughly the same
pattern. Like Mocan and Altindag (2011), we ﬁnd a small negative point estimate on β3. Our
estimates are similar in magnitude to those of Mocan and Altindag (2011), but we ﬁnd a far lower
level of statistical signiﬁcance, presumably because we cluster our standard errors by country.
Finally, we examine the behavior that was at the root of the scandals we discussed in the
introduction: the tendency of MEPs to sign the register and then immediately leave the building.
Recall that FractionSignedInAbsentip is deﬁned as the fraction of those sittings in year t when
MEP i signed the register but cast zero votes. In Table 8, we consider an OLS speciﬁcation of the
form:
FractionSignedInAbsentip = β0 + β1 × ∆lnSalaryc + β2 × EP7p
+β3 × EP7p × ∆lnSalaryc + εip. (6)
None of the coeﬃcients of interest, β1 through β3, is signiﬁcant in any speciﬁcation.
Coeﬃcient β3 in Tables 6 and 8 captures the overall impact (or lack there of) of salary change
on the intensive margin of labor supply. These coeﬃcients, however, reﬂect both a treatment eﬀect
(the impact on the MEPs who are in oﬃce) and a potential selection eﬀect (the change in the type
of MEPs that hold oﬃce). In Table 9, we try to disentangle these two eﬀects. In Panel A, we repeat
the analyses of Tables 6 and 8 limiting the sample to freshman MEPs in each parliament, while in
Panel B we use the sample of incumbent MEPs. To conserve space, we present only speciﬁcations
with country and individual controls, and those with country ﬁxed eﬀects. Overall, the estimate
17of β3 is much greater in magnitude and has a smaller standard error in Panel A than in Panel B.
This pattern suggests that, to the extent that there is any impact of salary on the intensive margin
of labor supply at all,29 it stems from a higher salary attracting MEPs who exert less eﬀort rather
than from a change in the eﬀort of incumbent MEPs. We further examine the selection eﬀects
induced by the salary change in the next subsection.
One possible reason for the limited impact of salaries on the intensive margin is that politicians’
motivations to exert eﬀort while in oﬃce may be dominated by non-pecuniary considerations. In
particular, the desire to perform one’s public duty combined with the fear of social sanction may
prevent shirking. Following the approach in Fisman and Miguel (2007), we use corruption as a
proxy for a country’s social norms. Looking back at Tables 6-8, we observe that home-country
corruption is consistently associated with lower attendance: MEPs from more corrupt countries
are more likely to be absent from roll-call votes; they are less likely to sign the daily register; and
conditional on signing the register, they are more likely to be absent. The estimates are large in
magnitude. For example, the point estimate on corruption in Table 8 (Column 2) implies that
a one standard deviation increase in the corruption level of an MEP’s home country increases
FractionSignedInAbsentip (evaluated at the sample mean of 8.0 percent) by about 16 percent.
It is worth noting that our results on corruption are identiﬁed from cross-sectional variation;
unsurprisingly, when we include country ﬁxed eﬀects, the impact of corruption is inconsistent in
magnitude and signiﬁcance, as within-country variation in corruption ratings is essentially noise.
In contrast, we take advantage of a plausibly exogenous salary change to identify the sensitivity
of MEP behavior to ﬁnancial incentives. Hence, our evidence on the eﬀects of social norms may
be more vulnerable to omitted variable bias. That said, the coeﬃcient on corruption remains very
stable in magnitude and signiﬁcance as we include additional covariates. This stability suggests
that if the observable characteristics in our data are representative of the unobservables, omitted
variable bias is unlikely to drive our results (Altonji, Elder, and Taber 2005).
29Note that β3 is not signiﬁcant in any speciﬁcation once we include country ﬁxed eﬀects.
183.3 Quality of MEPs
The fact that higher wages induce more individuals to seek a political oﬃce does not by itself imply
that the quality of elected oﬃcials will increase. In fact, as discussed in the introduction, there are
several theoretical models which suggest that a higher salary may lower the quality of candidates
and elected politicians. Moreover, Table 9 presented suggestive evidence that higher salary attracts
MEPs that are more prone to absenteeism and shirking. In this subsection, we analyze the impact
of the salary change on the quality of elected MEPs as proxied by the global rankings of the
undergraduate institutions they attended. Many studies have found that individuals who attend
more selective colleges have greater permanent income. For example, Kane (1998) shows that, in
the United States, attending a college with a 100 point higher average SAT is associated with 3
to 7 percent higher earnings later in life.30 Hence, MEPs who attended a more selective college
are likely to be more productive workers, and as long as market skill is positively correlated with
political skill, this would also mean they are likely to be more eﬀective politicians. Moreover,
college selectivity of an MEP strongly predicts reelection conditional on rerunning – a pattern that
continues to hold if we include country ﬁxed eﬀects and/or controls for other MEP characteristics.31
This correlation further supports our view that college selectivity is a good proxy for MEPs’ quality,
particularly in the eyes of voters.
In Section 2, we describe the construction of the variable FractionRankedCollegecp. In Table
10, we consider OLS speciﬁcations of the form:
FractionRankedCollegecp = β0+β1×∆lnSalaryc+β2×EP7p+β3×EP7p×∆lnSalaryc+εcp. (7)
In Columns (1) through (3), we simply drop the 10% of MEPs where we could not identify their
undergraduate institutions. In Column (1), coeﬃcient β1 is imprecisely estimated. Estimate of
β2 is positive and signiﬁcant (p < 0.01) which means that, net of the impact of salary change, the
quality of MEPs in EP7 was greater than in EP6. The estimate of β3 is −0.06 (p < 0.01). This
implies that doubling an MEP’s salary reduces the likelihood than an elected MEP attended a
30Most of the literature on this topic strives to disentangle the causal impact of college selectivity on future earnings
from selection eﬀects (e.g., Dale and Krueger 2002). For our purposes, however, it does not matter whether college
selectivity causes or simply predicts high permanent income.
31Results available on request.
19top university by 4.2 percentage points. Given that around 30% of MEPs overall attend a top
university, this is a reduction of 14 percent. In Column (2) we include country by EP controls. The
estimate of β3 is unaﬀected. Column (3) includes country ﬁxed eﬀects. This makes the coeﬃcient
less precisely estimated, and thus no longer signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level (p = 0.079). In
Columns (4) through (6) we redeﬁne our outcome variable FractionRankedCollegecp by including
all MEPs and coding those with missing education data as having gone to an unranked school.
This alternative speciﬁcation slightly strengthens our results.
Overall, our results provide support for the view, emphasized by theoretical work discussed
in the introduction, that higher salaries might decrease the quality of elected oﬃcials. Thus, at
least in the context of the European Parliament, this negative selection eﬀect needs to be weighed
against the beneﬁts of increased competition suggested by the results in Subsection 3.1.
3.4 Intensive margin of labor supply and election outcomes
Finally, we turn to the relationship between absenteeism and shirking, on one hand, and the
likelihood that an incumbent MEP gets elected conditional on running for reelection on the other.
In Table 11, we consider a linear probability model:
ReElectedip = β0 + β1 × AttendanceRecordip−1 + εip. (8)
The sample is the set of all MEPs who served in EP5 and ran for reelection for EP6 and MEPs who
served in EP6 and ran for reelection for EP7. ReElectedip is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the
MEP was elected to parliament p. We consider the same three measures of AttendanceRecordip−1
as in the previous subsection, but incorporate votes in all years, since there is no clear reason to
limit the sample to the ﬁrst year of each parliament. In Columns (1), (3), and (5), we report the
coeﬃcients from the regressions in Equation (8). In Columns (2), (4), and (6), we add controls for
EP7, MEP by EP controls, and country ﬁxed eﬀects. Across all speciﬁcations, we ﬁnd that MEPs
with better attendance records are signiﬁcantly more likely to be reelected at the 5% level. The
only exception is the estimate in Column (4) where the point estimate on FractionSignedInip−1
is only signiﬁcant at the 10% level. Of course, the results in Table 11 should be interpreted with
20considerable caution since we are looking at reelection results conditional on the fact that the MEP
chose to run for reelection. With that caveat in mind, these results provide suggestive evidence
that voters prefer MEPs who exert more eﬀort while in oﬃce.
If this relationship between electoral success and eﬀort is assumed to be causal, it becomes
more diﬃcult to reconcile our two earlier ﬁndings: higher salaries make the oﬃce of MEP more
desirable but do not decrease shirking. It may be, however, that the increased electoral incentive
is insuﬃcient to induce higher eﬀort, or that MEPs are myopic in their behavior between elections.
3.5 Endogeneity concerns
The validity of the analysis in the preceding subsections rests on the assumption that the timing
of the change in salary regime is uncorrelated with a change in other factors that diﬀerentially
aﬀect MEPs from low-salary and high-salary countries. One concern would be that the salary
equalization proposal got passed precisely when the MEPs from low-salary countries were more
likely to run for reelection and thus particularly motivated to raise future salaries. There are two
sets of facts that alleviate this concern. First, this explanation could not account for the increased
number of parties that ﬁeld a candidate when salaries increase. If anything, facing more motivated
incumbents would be a deterrent that would lead to fewer challengers. Second, as we report in
Table 12, whether an MEP voted for or against salary harmonization is uncorrelated with whether
the regime change would raise or lower her salary. Speciﬁcally, we let V oteForSalaryChangei be
an indicator variable for whether MEP i voted for salary harmonization and we consider a linear
probability model:
V oteForSalaryChangei = β0 + β1 × ∆lnSalaryc + εi. (9)
Whether we consider this baseline speciﬁcation (Column 1), add MEP-level controls (Column 2),
or further include country-level controls (Column 3), the estimate of β1 is small and insigniﬁcant.
Similarly, if we include V oteForSalaryChangei as a control to any of the regressions considered
above, the results are unchanged.
214 Conclusion
We provide evidence on the impact of pecuniary and non-pecuniary incentives on both the extensive
and the intensive margins of politicians’ labor supply. We take advantage of a unique set of
circumstances – a salary reform in the European Parliament that allows for a credible identiﬁcation
of ﬁnancial motives, and the cross-country nature of the parliament itself which provides variation in
the norms of politicians’ home communities. We also introduce an innovative measure of politicians’
shirking, based on signing the attendance register to collect a daily allowance, but not participating
in session votes.
Our results imply that a higher salary: (i) attracts more candidates and more parties, (ii) has
no substantial impact on eﬀort exerted while in oﬃce, and (iii) reduces the quality of elected MEPs.
Meanwhile, non-pecuniary factors seem to play an important role in inducing politicians to exert
eﬀort while in oﬃce.
There are many questions raised by these results. Most obviously, it would be important to
know the extent to which our set of ﬁndings would carry over to politicians in other places or
other levels of government. Furthermore, while we ﬁnd that home-country social norms inﬂuence
the intensive margin of labor supply, we are unable to distinguish whether these norms operate
through politicians’ internal motivations or through social pressure from the electorate. By care-
fully considering how the media coverage of scandals aﬀects MEPs’ behavior, one might better
understand the relative importance of these two channels. It may also be useful to understand
whether political institutions such as term limits and electoral rules interact with pecuniary and
non-pecuniary motives in inﬂuencing politicians’ behavior. Finally, given our preliminary results
on the role of selection eﬀects in the behavior of elected MEPs, it will be important to assess the
impacts of salary changes in the longer run.
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FIGURE 1 
Change in Fraction of MEPs Who Ran for Reelection vs. Change in Salary 
 
 
ReRunip is an indicator variable for whether MEP i who served in parliament p – 1 ran for reelection for parliament 
p. ReRuncp is the mean of ReRunip for MEPs from country c. ΔReRunc is ReRunc7 minus ReRunc6. ΔlnSalaryc is 
defined as the logarithm of 84,000 (the post-change uniform salary level) minus the logarithm of the salary for 
MEPs from country c as of December 2004.  Closed, ordered, and open refer to the type of electoral system in each 
country.  Countries  are  labeled  with  their  ISO  codes:  Austria  (AUT),  Belgium  (BEL),  Cyprus  (CYP),  Czech 
Republic (CZE), Denmark (DNK), Estonia (EST), Finland (FIN), France (FRA), Germany (DEU), Greece (GRC), 
Hungary (HUN), Ireland (IRL), Italy (ITA), Latvia (LVA), Lithuania (LTU), Luxembourg (LUX), Malta (MLT), 
Netherlands (NLD), Poland (POL), Portugal (PRT), Slovakia (SVK), Slovenia (SVN), Spain (ESP), Sweden (SWE), 








































Change in Number of Parties Fielding Candidates vs. Change in Salary 
 
 
lnNumPartiescp is the logarithm of the number of parties in country c that received at least 0.5% of the vote for 
parliament p. ΔlnNumPartiesc is defined as lnNumPartiesc7 minus lnNumPartiesc6. ΔlnSalaryc is the logarithm of 
84,000 (the post-change uniform salary level) minus the logarithm of the salary for MEPs from country c as of 
December 2004. Closed, ordered, and open refer to the type of electoral system in each country. Countries are 
labeled with their ISO codes: Austria (AUT), Belgium (BEL), Cyprus (CYP), Czech Republic (CZE), Denmark 
(DNK), Estonia (EST), Finland (FIN), France (FRA), Germany (DEU), Greece (GRC), Hungary (HUN), Ireland 
(IRL), Italy (ITA), Latvia (LVA), Lithuania (LTU), Luxembourg (LUX), Malta (MLT), Netherlands (NLD), Poland 
(POL),  Portugal  (PRT),  Slovakia  (SVK),  Slovenia  (SVN),  Spain  (ESP),  Sweden  (SWE),  and  United  Kingdom 
(GBR).  








































  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max  Obs. 
A. MEP-Parliament Variables         
Ageip  54.32  9.96  22  87  1,608 
AgeSqip/100  30.50  10.73  4.84  75.69  1,608 
Tenureip  7.12  5.93  0  29  1,608 
ReRunip  0.572  0.495  0  1  1,592 
ReElectedip  0.699  0.459  0  1  967 
PostVoteQuitip  0.111  0.314  0  1  1,608 
FractionAbsentip  0.184  0.151  0  1  1,417 
FractionSignedInip  0.884  0.134  0  1  1,417 
FractionSignedInAbsentip  0.080  0.079  0  1  1,410 
           
B. Country-Parliament Variables         
lnNumPartiescp  2.124  0.345  1.099  2.996  50 
FractionRankedCollegecp  0.330  0.250  0  1  50 
           
C. Country Variables           
ΔlnSalaryc  0.645  0.767  –0.540  2.120  25 
lnGDPPCc  9.598  0.702  8.492  10.859  25 
Corruptionc  –1.175  0.631  –2.220  –0.291  25 
  
A. MEP-Parliament Variables.  Ageip and AgeSqip/100 are based on the age of MEP i in  the first  year of 
parliament p. Tenureip is the number of years MEP i has been in office as of the first year of parliament p. ReRunip is 
an indicator variable that equals 1 if MEP i served in parliament p – 1 and ran for reelection for parliament p. 
ReRunip is missing for 16 observations. ReElectedip is an indicator variable for whether MEP i served in parliament p 
– 1 and was reelected to parliament p. PostVoteQuitip is an indicator variable that equals 1 if MEP i served in 
parliament p and quit before completing the parliamentary term at some point after June 23rd of the second calendar 
year of parliament p. FractionAbsentip is the fraction of sittings in the first parliament year of parliament p during 
which MEP i did not participate in any of the roll-call votes. FractionSignedInip is the fraction of sittings in the first 
parliament year of parliament p during which MEP i signed the daily register. FractionSignedInAbsentip is the 
fraction of sittings during which MEP i signed the register in the first parliament year of parliament p that she did 
not participate in any of the roll-call votes. FractionSignedInAbsentip is missing for MEPs who never signed in.  
B. Country-Parliament  Variables.  lnNumPartiescp  is  defined  as  the  logarithm  of  the  number  of  parties  in 
country c that received at least 0.5% of the vote for parliament p. FractionRankedCollegecp is the fraction of MEPs 
from country c in parliament p who attended a college ranked in the top 500 by the 2010 Academic Ranking of 
World Universities.  
C. Country Variables.  ΔlnSalaryc is defined as the logarithm of 84,000 (the post-change uniform salary level) 
minus the logarithm of the salary for MEPs from country c as of December 2004. lnGDPPCc is the logarithm of the 
GDP per capita in constant 2000 U.S. dollars in country c and year 2005 from the World Development Indicators. 
Corruptionc is the measure of corruption in country c and year 2005 based on Kaufmann et al. (2010).  
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TABLE 2 
Gross Annual Salaries of MEPs by Country 
 
Country  Annual Salary (€)   Country  Annual Salary (€) 
Austria  106,583    Latvia  12,518 
Belgium  72,018    Lithuania  14,197 
Cyprus  52,041    Luxembourg  63,791 
Czech Republic  19,774    Malta  15,534 
Denmark  69,816    Netherlands  86,126 
Estonia  21,864    Poland  28,860 
Finland  59,640    Portugal  48,286 
France  81,273    Slovakia  14,085 
Germany  84,108    Slovenia  48,815 
Greece  73,850    Spain  38,396 
Hungary  10,080    Sweden  62,069 
Ireland  83,712    United Kingdom  83,312 
Italy  144,084       
 
Annual pre-tax salary in nominal € as of December, 2004. Source: Corbett et al. (2005).   30 
 
TABLE 3 
Effect of Salary Change on Willingness of Incumbent MEPs to Seek Reelection 
Dependent variable: ReRunip 
 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
ΔlnSalaryc    –0.1757**    –0.1603*      –0.1698** 
    (0.0382)     (0.0604)    (0.0578)   
EP7p    –0.0902**      –0.0874**      –0.0715**      –0.0800** 
  (0.0215)     (0.0238)    (0.0224)    (0.0241) 
EP7p × ΔlnSalaryc      0.3010**        0.3127**        0.3323**        0.3290** 
  (0.0250)     (0.0312)    (0.0313)    (0.0407) 
lnGDPPCcp 
 
–0.0417    0.0115    0.0571 
       (0.0835)    (0.0857)    (0.2745) 
Corruptioncp 
 
  –0.1200*  –0.0953    0.1792 
       (0.0551)    (0.0536)    (0.0921) 
Ageip 
   
      0.0403**        0.0417** 
        (0.0098)    (0.0100) 
AgeSqip/100 
   
    –0.0439**      –0.0448** 
        (0.0101)    (0.0102) 
lnTenureip 
   
–0.0279  –0.0426 
        (0.0214)    (0.0269) 
Country Fixed Effects  No  No  No  Yes 
Observations  1,592  1,592  1,592  1,592 
R
2  0.043  0.056  0.089  0.123 
 
Linear probability model; robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. The level of observation is 
MEP-Parliament for EP6 and EP7. The sample consists of all MEPs in EP5 and those who joined EP6 before the 
vote on salary change. The dependent variable in all regressions is ReRunip, an indicator variable that equals 1 if 
MEP i served in parliament p – 1 and ran for reelection for parliament p. ΔlnSalaryc is defined as the logarithm of 
84,000 (the post-change uniform salary level) minus the logarithm of the salary for MEPs from country c as of 
December 2004. EP7p is an indicator variable for whether p = 7. lnGDPPCcp, Corruptioncp, Ageip, AgeSqip/100, and 
lnTenureip are measured in the last year of parliament p – 1 and are defined in Table 1.  
 * significant at 5 percent; ** significant at 1 percent.  
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TABLE 4 
Effect of Salary Change on MEPs Quitting Before Completing Term After Vote 
Dependent variable: PostVoteQuitip 
 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
ΔlnSalaryc  –0.0327    0.0275    0.0536 
      (0.0176)    (0.0399)    (0.0317)   
EP6p    0.0485    0.0418    0.0319    0.0133 
    (0.0404)    (0.0350)    (0.0329)    (0.0253) 
EP6p × ΔlnSalaryc  –0.0317  –0.0508    –0.0892*      –0.1260** 
    (0.0439)    (0.0410)    (0.0332)    (0.0317) 
lnGDPPCcp 
 
    0.1392*    0.1129      0.4963* 
      (0.0557)    (0.0615)    (0.2182) 
Corruptioncp 
 
      0.1104**        0.1251**        0.4651** 
      (0.0341)    (0.0336)    (0.0986) 
Ageip 
   
–0.0089  –0.0083 
        (0.0076)    (0.0069) 
AgeSqip/100 
   
  0.0052    0.0047 
        (0.0074)    (0.0068) 
lnTenureip 
   
      0.0654**        0.0567** 
        (0.0195)    (0.0166) 
Country Fixed Effects  No  No  No  Yes 
Observations  1,608  1,608  1,608  1,608 
R
2  0.015  0.028  0.047  0.087 
 
Linear probability model; robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. The level of observation is 
MEP-Parliament for EP5 and EP6. The sample consists of all MEPs in EP5 and those who joined EP6 before the 
vote on salary change. The dependent variable in all regressions is PostVoteQuitip, an indicator variable that equals 1 
if MEP i quit her job before completing the parliamentary term at some point after June 23rd of the second calendar 
year of parliament p. For p = 6, the variable indicates whether the MEP quit the parliament at some point after the 
vote on the salary change. For p = 5, the variable indicates whether MEP i quit the parliament during the same 
segment  of  the  electoral  cycle  but  before  the  salary  change  had  been  introduced.  ΔlnSalaryc  is  defined  as  the 
logarithm of 84,000 (the post-change uniform salary level) minus the logarithm of the salary for MEPs from country 
c  as  of  December  2004.  EP6p  is  an  indicator  variable  for  whether  p  =  6.  lnGDPPCcp,  Corruptioncp,  Ageip, 
AgeSqip/100, and lnTenureip are measured in the last year of parliament p – 1 and are defined in Table 1. 
 * significant at 5 percent; ** significant at 1 percent.  
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TABLE 5 
Effect of Salary Change on Number of Parties Fielding Candidates 
Dependent variable: lnNumPartiescp 
 
   (1)  (2)  (3) 
ΔlnSalaryc    –0.2161*  –0.3009 
       (0.0966)    (0.1912)   
EP7p  –0.0159  –0.0230    0.0734 
     (0.0564)    (0.0703)    (0.1144) 
EP7p × ΔlnSalaryc      0.1570*      0.1691*     0.2168* 
     (0.0627)    (0.0706)    (0.1037) 
lnGDPPCcp 
 
–0.0756  –0.7212 
      (0.2636)    (1.0365) 
Corruptioncp 
 
  0.0622  –0.1652 
      (0.1370)    (0.4072) 
Country Fixed Effects  No  No  Yes 
Observations  50  50  50 
R
2  0.134  0.175  0.919 
 
OLS; robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. The level of observation is Country-Parliament for 
EP6 and EP7. The dependent variable in all regressions is lnNumPartiescp, the logarithm of the number of parties in 
country c that fielded a candidate and received at least 0.5% of the vote for candidacy to parliament p. ΔlnSalaryc is 
defined as the logarithm of 84,000 (the post-change uniform salary level) minus the logarithm of the salary for 
MEPs from country c as of December 2004. EP7p is an indicator variable for whether p = 7. lnGDPPCcp and 
Corruptioncp are measured in the last year of parliament p – 1 and are defined in Table 1.  
* significant at 5 percent; ** significant at 1 percent.  
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TABLE 6 
Effect of Salary Change on Absenteeism 
Dependent variable: FractionAbsentip 
 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
ΔlnSalaryc  –0.0380  –0.0235  –0.0244 
      (0.0280)    (0.0348)    (0.0351)   
EP7p  –0.0029  –0.0139  –0.0137  –0.0046 
    (0.0224)    (0.0245)    (0.0243)    (0.0119) 
EP7p × ΔlnSalaryc    0.0476    0.0482    0.0453    0.0044 
    (0.0256)    (0.0296)    (0.0296)    (0.0185) 
lnGDPPCcp 
 
  0.0490    0.0422      0.5084* 
      (0.0427)    (0.0446)    (0.1935) 
Corruptioncp 
 
      0.0573**        0.0571**  –0.0303 
      (0.0188)    (0.0198)    (0.0757) 
Ageip 
   
–0.0059  –0.0056 
        (0.0034)    (0.0033) 
AgeSqip/100 
   
  0.0059    0.0057 
        (0.0033)    (0.0032) 
lnTenureip 
   
  0.0081      0.0091* 
        (0.0041)    (0.0034) 
Country Fixed Effects  No  No  No  Yes 
Observations  1,417  1,417  1,417  1,417 
R
2  0.018  0.041  0.047  0.097 
 
OLS; robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. The level of observation is MEP-Parliament for 
EP6 and EP7. The sample consists of all MEPs in EP6 and EP7. The dependent variable in all regressions is 
FractionAbsentip, the fraction of sittings in the first parliament year of parliament p during which MEP i did not 
participate in any of the roll-call votes. ΔlnSalaryc is defined as the logarithm of 84,000 (the post-change uniform 
salary level) minus the logarithm of the salary for MEPs from country c as of December 2004. EP7p is an indicator 
variable for whether p = 7. lnGDPPCcp, Corruptioncp, Ageip, AgeSqip/100, and lnTenureip are measured in the first 
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TABLE 7 
Effect of Salary Change on Signing the Register 
Dependent variable: FractionSignedInip 
 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
ΔlnSalaryc    0.0346    0.0117    0.0126 
      (0.0197)    (0.0283)    (0.0282)   
EP7p    0.0064    0.0157    0.0163    0.0122 
    (0.0139)    (0.0158)    (0.0157)    (0.0097) 
EP7p × ΔlnSalaryc  –0.0283  –0.0277  –0.0259  –0.0042 
    (0.0147)    (0.0176)    (0.0175)    (0.0141) 
lnGDPPCcp 
 
–0.0555  –0.0515  –0.2953 
      (0.0348)    (0.0370)    (0.1646) 
Corruptioncp 
 
    –0.0478**    –0.0488*  –0.0071 
      (0.0169)    (0.0176)    (0.0580) 
Ageip 
   
    0.0081*      0.0074* 
        (0.0032)    (0.0030) 
AgeSqip/100 
   
  –0.0077*    –0.0071* 
        (0.0032)    (0.0031) 
lnTenureip 
   
–0.0071    –0.0081* 
        (0.0038)    (0.0037) 
Country Fixed Effects  No  No  No  Yes 
Observations  1,417  1,417  1,417  1,417 
R
2  0.017  0.032  0.041  0.078 
 
OLS; robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. The level of observation is MEP-Parliament for 
EP6 and EP7. The sample consists of all MEPs in EP6 and EP7. The dependent variable in all regressions is 
FractionSignedInip, the fraction of sittings in the first parliament year of parliament p during which MEP i signed 
the daily register. ΔlnSalaryc is defined as the logarithm of 84,000 (the post-change uniform salary level) minus the 
logarithm of the salary for MEPs from country c as of December 2004. EP7p is an indicator variable for whether p = 
7. lnGDPPCcp, Corruptioncp, Ageip, AgeSqip/100, and lnTenureip are measured in the first year of parliament p and 
are as defined in Table 1.  * significant at 5 percent; ** significant at 1 percent.  
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TABLE 8 
Effect of Salary Change on Shirking 
Dependent variable: FractionSignedInAbsentip 
 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
ΔlnSalaryc  –0.0090    –0.0160  –0.0160 
      (0.0138)    (0.0165)    (0.0165)   
EP7p    0.00286  –0.00081    0.000091    0.00525 
    (0.01335)    (0.01377)    (0.013716)    (0.00677) 
EP7p × ΔlnSalaryc    0.0253    0.0268    0.0250  –0.00084 
    (0.0168)    (0.0185)    (0.0187)    (0.01189) 
lnGDPPCcp 
 
  0.0011   –0.0030        0.2994** 
      (0.0201)    (0.0194)    (0.0991) 
Corruptioncp 
 
    0.0202*      0.0189*  –0.0345 
      (0.0084)    (0.0083)    (0.0389) 
Ageip 
   
    0.00215    0.00175 
          (0.00146)    (0.00147) 
AgeSqip/100 
   
  –0.00159  –0.00129 
          (0.00138)    (0.00142) 
lnTenureip 
   
    0.00221    0.00221 
          (0.00288)    (0.00253) 
Country Fixed Effects  No  No  No  Yes 
Observations  1,410  1,410  1,410  1,410 
R
2  0.018  0.041  0.048  0.105 
 
OLS; robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. The level of observation is MEP-Parliament for 
EP6 and EP7. The sample consists of all MEPs in EP6 and EP7. The dependent variable in all regressions is 
FractionSignedInAbsentip, the fraction of sittings during which MEP i signed the register in the first parliament year 
of parliament p that she did not participate in any of the roll-call votes. ΔlnSalaryc is defined as the logarithm of 
84,000 (the post-change uniform salary level) minus the logarithm of the salary for MEPs from country c as of 
December 2004. EP7p is an indicator variable for whether p = 7. lnGDPPCcp, Corruptioncp, Ageip, AgeSqip/100, and 
lnTenureip are measured in the first year of parliament p and are defined in Table 1.  





Effect of Salary Change on the Intensive Margin of Labor Supply 
 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Dependent variable:  FractionAbsentip  FractionSignedInAbsentip 
  Panel A: Freshman MEPs 
ΔlnSalaryc  –0.0130    –0.0115   
    (0.0348)      (0.0180)   
EP7p  –0.0316  –0.0291  –0.0194  –0.0127 
    (0.0227)    (0.0154)    (0.0136)    (0.0081) 
EP7p × ΔlnSalaryc    0.0567    0.0127     0.0428*    0.0178 
    (0.0283)    (0.0224)    (0.0188)    (0.0189) 
MEP by EP Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Country by EP Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Country Fixed Effects  No  Yes  No  Yes 
Observations  709  709  709  709 
R
2  0.058  0.112  0.063  0.120 
  Panel B: Incumbent MEPs 
ΔlnSalaryc  –0.0369    –0.0189   
    (0.0410)      (0.0170)   
EP7p   0.0028    0.0180    0.0170     0.0210* 
   (0.0244)    (0.0140)    (0.0127)    (0.0078) 
EP7p × ΔlnSalaryc   0.0215  –0.0067    0.0015  –0.0188 
   (0.0357)    (0.0284)    (0.0190)    (0.0140) 
MEP by EP Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Country by EP Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Country Fixed Effects  No  Yes  No  Yes 
Observations  708  708  701  701 
R
2  0.054  0.115  0.067  0.140 
 
OLS; robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. The level of observation is MEP-Parliament for 
EP6 and EP7. The sample consists of all MEPs in EP6 and EP7. FractionAbsentip is the fraction of sittings in the 
first  parliament  year  of  parliament  p  during  which  MEP  i  did  not  participate  in  any  of  the  roll-call  votes. 
FractionSignedInAbsentip is the fraction of sittings during which MEP i signed the register in the first parliament 
year of parliament p that she did not participate in any of the roll-call votes. All columns include Country by EP 
controls (lnGDPPCcp and Corruptioncp) and MEP by EP controls (Ageip, AgeSqip/100, and lnTenureip). ΔlnSalaryc is 
defined as the logarithm of 84,000 (the post-change uniform salary level) minus the logarithm of the salary for 
MEPs  from  country  c  as  of  December  2004.  EP7p  is  an  indicator  variable  for  whether  p  =  7. lnGDPPCcp, 
Corruptioncp, Ageip, AgeSqip/100, and lnTenureip are measured in the first year of parliament p and are defined in 
Table 1.  * significant at 5 percent; ** significant at 1 percent.   
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 TABLE 10 
Effect of Salary Change on MEP Selection as Measured By College Selectivity 
Dependent variable: FractionRankedCollegecp 
 
MEPs Missing College Data:  Dropped     Coded as Unranked   
   (1)  (2)  (3)     (4)  (5)  (6)   
ΔlnSalaryc  –0.0344  –0.0020 
 
   –0.0164    0.0092 
 
 
    (0.0564)    (0.0922)         (0.0507)     (0.0820)     
EP7p        0.1285**        0.1463**      0.1357*           0.1558**        0.1744**      0.1605*   
    (0.0218)    (0.0299)    (0.0624)       (0.0226)    (0.0267)    (0.0690)   
EP7p × ΔlnSalaryc      –0.0600**   –0.0645*  –0.0836         –0.0759**      –0.0794**    –0.1024*   
    (0.0162)    (0.0263)    (0.0455)       (0.0150)    (0.0243)    (0.0441)   
lnGDPPCcp 
 
–0.0174    0.1607    
 
–0.0274    0.1927   
      (0.1603)    (0.3666)         (0.1432)    (0.3542)   
Corruptioncp 
 
–0.1045  –0.0817    
 
–0.1064  –0.0744   
      (0.1013)    (0.2348)         (0.0878)    (0.2468)   
Country Fixed Effects  No  No  Yes     No  No  Yes   
Observations  50  50  50     50  50  50   
R
2  0.127  0.199  0.944     0.171  0.248  0.940   
 
OLS; robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. The level of observation is Country-Parliament for EP6 and EP7. The dependent variable in all 
regressions is FractionRankedCollegecp, the fraction of MEPs from country c in parliament p who attended a school ranked in the top 500 by the 2010 Academic 
Ranking of World Universities. In Columns (1)-(3), MEPs that are missing college information are dropped from the sample. In Columns (4)-(6), MEPs that are 
missing college information are assumed to not have attended a school ranked in the top 500. ΔlnSalaryc is defined as the logarithm of 84,000 (the post-change 
uniform salary level) minus the logarithm of the salary for MEPs from country c as of December 2004. EP7p is an indicator variable for whether p = 7. 




Effect of Absenteeism on Likelihood MEP Is Reelected 
Dependent variable: ReElectedip 
 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
FractionAbsentip-1  –0.3375*    –0.2543* 
          (0.1313)    (0.1049)         
FractionSignedInip-1 
   
  0.3293*    0.2210 
          (0.1503)    (0.1285)     
FractionSignedInAbsentip-1 
       
–0.4745*    –0.3749* 
          (0.2021)    (0.1461) 
EP7p 
 
  0.0217 
 
  0.0243 
 
  0.0313 
      (0.0462)      (0.0452)      (0.0480) 
lnGDPPCcp 
 
  –1.1719* 
 
  –1.1824* 
 
  –1.2744* 








      (0.3773)      (0.3667)      (0.3850) 
Ageip 
 
  0.0060 
 
  0.0073 
 
  0.0091 








      (0.0140)      (0.0142)      (0.0141) 
lnTenureip 
 
    0.1001* 
 
   0.1007* 
 
    0.0946* 
      (0.0403)      (0.0415)      (0.0396) 
Country Fixed Effects  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes 
Observations  967  967  967  967  965  965 
R
2  0.017  0.130  0.013  0.126  0.010  0.128 
Linear probability model; robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. The level of observation is MEP-Parliament for EP6 and EP7. The sample 
consists of all MEPs who served in EP5 and ran for reelection for EP6 and all MEPs who served in EP6 and ran for reelection for EP7. The dependent variable in 
all regressions is ReElectedip, an indicator variable for whether MEP i was reelected to parliament p. EP7p is an indicator variable for whether p = 7. lnGDPPCcp, 
Corruptioncp, Ageip, AgeSqip/100, and lnTenureip are measured in the last year of parliament p – 1 and are defined in Table 1. FractionAbsentip is the fraction of 
sittings in all years of parliament p during which MEP i did not participate in any of the roll-call votes. FractionSignedInip is the fraction of sittings in all years of 
parliament p during which MEP i signed the daily register. FractionSignedInAbsentip is the fraction of sittings during which MEP i signed the register in all years 




The Effect of Salary Change on MEPs’ Support of Salary Harmonization 
Dependent variable: VoteForSalaryChangei 
   
   (1)  (2)  (3) 
ΔlnSalaryc  0.0016  –0.0045    0.1165 
  (0.0569)    (0.0572)    (0.1217) 
Agei 
 
  0.0068    0.0073 
      (0.0103)    (0.0098) 
AgeSqi/100 
 
–0.0078  –0.0081 
        (0.0094)    (0.0089) 
lnTenurei 
 
–0.0081  –0.0176 
      (0.0281)    (0.0247) 
lnGDPPCc 
   
  0.2002 
        (0.1909) 
Corruptionc 
   
  0.0551 
        (0.1353) 
Observations  764  764  764 
R
2  0.0000  0.0016  0.0090 
 
Linear probability model; robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. The level of observation is 
MEP. The sample consists of all MEPs who were members of the Parliament at the time of the vote. The dependent 
variable in all regressions is VoteForSalaryChangei, an indicator variable for whether MEP i voted for the salary 
change. ΔlnSalaryc is defined as the logarithm of 84,000 (the post-change uniform salary level) minus the logarithm 
of the salary for MEPs from country c as of December 2004. Agei, AgeSqi/100, Tenurei, lnGDPPCc, and Corruptionc 
are measured in the parliament year of the vote on salary change (July 1, 2004 to June 30, 2005) and are defined in 
Table 1.  * significant at 5 percent; ** significant at 1 percent.  